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Abstract
In this paper we provide an overview of the growth model in China and its prospects, taking 
a medium-run to long-run perspective. Our main conclusions are as follows. First, the still 
prevailing producer-biased model of managed capitalism in China tends to engender, as an 
inherent byproduct, serious imbalances which cannot be unwound without a fundamental 
overhaul of the model itself. Second, given the lack of a critical mass of economic reforms 
thus far, imbalances may (re-)escalate once global and domestic economic conditions 
normalise. Third, the fundamental factors underpinning growth in China are likely to remain 
supportive, at least over the medium run. Although this could help mitigate the economic 
costs of imbalances for some time to come, it could also reduce the incentives for policy-
makers to enact much needed reforms. Fourth, delayed policy action and the persistence 
of the model of growth cum imbalances would increase the risk of China getting caught in 
the middle-income trap in the long run. Greater political will to redirect China’s growth model 
towards a more sustainable path is therefore needed.
Keywords: economic growth, rebalancing, China, imbalances, middle-income trap.
JEL classifi cation: E21, E22, E25, F14, F43, O11, O53.
Resumen
Este artículo analiza el modelo de crecimiento de China y sus perspectivas a medio y largo 
plazo. Las principales conclusiones del trabajo son, en primer lugar, que este modelo de 
crecimiento, sesgado hacia los productores y basado en un capitalismo supervisado, tiende 
a engendrar, como subproducto inherente, signifi cativos desequilibrios económicos que no 
tienen visos de revertir sin una revisión fundamental del propio modelo. En segundo lugar, 
que, dada la ausencia de una masa crítica de reformas, los desequilibrios pueden (re)surgir 
una vez que las condiciones económicas mundiales y nacionales se normalicen. En tercer 
lugar, que, los factores que sustentan el crecimiento persistirán al menos a medio plazo, lo 
que ayudaría a mitigar transitoriamente el coste asociado a los desequilibrios, pero también 
podría desincentivar la puesta en marcha de necesarias reformas. Por último, que el retraso 
en la actuación de las políticas económicas y la persistencia de un modelo de crecimiento que 
genera severos desequilibrios aumentan el riesgo de que China no llegue a alcanzar el nivel 
de renta de las economías avanzadas. Por todo ello, es necesaria una mayor voluntad política 
para reorientar el modelo de crecimiento hacia una senda más sostenible.
Palabras clave: crecimiento económico, re-equilibrio, China, desequilibrios, middle-income trap.
Códigos JEL: E21, E22, E25, F14, F43, O11, O53.
CONTENTS
Executive Summary ........................................................................................8
1. Looking at the past: sustained growth cum imbalances.........................12
 1.1 China’s system of policy incentives .......................................................12
 1.2 What did China’s growth model deliver? ................................................13
 1.3 Defi ning China’s economic imbalances ..................................................15
 Box 1  Could an appreciation of the Renminbi’s exchange rate 
increase the share of employment in the services sector? .................17
 Box 2  Measuring the impact of fi nancial repression 
on income distribution in China .........................................................20
2.  Looking at the present: the implications of external 
and domestic imbalances ........................................................................22
 2.1 Tensions on the external front ................................................................22
  2.1.1 The current account surplus ...........................................................22
  2.1.2 FX reserve accumulation and its costs ............................................24
  2.1.3 Exchange rate misalignment ...........................................................26
  2.1.4  Capital controls and the internationalisation 
of the Renmimbi .............................................................................29
 2.2  Tensions on the domestic front .............................................................30
  2.2.1 Monetary policy ineffi ciencies ..........................................................30
 Box 3  Real effective exchange rate appreciation: adjustment via 
the nominal exchange rate or domestic infl ation? Lessons 
for China from the past experience of Japan vs Germany ..................32
  2.2.2 Assets and housing price boom-bust cycles ...................................33
 Box 4  Are property prices overvalued in China? Evidence from 
a cross-regional model .....................................................................35
  2.2.3 The link between fi scal sustainability and fi nancial stability ...............36
 Box 5 Can China outgrow its non-performing loans?...................................38
3  Looking to the future: are the long-term factors that 
have been supporting China’s growth running out?...............................39
 3.1 Will China continue to over-invest? ........................................................40
 3.2 Has China reached the Lewis turning point? ..........................................42
 3.3 How long can China’s world market share keep growing? .....................43
 Box 6 Is China climbing up the quality ladder? ............................................44
 3.4 Will protectionism against China rise? ...................................................47
4.  The thorny path to rebalancing ................................................................48
 4.1 Stocktaking of rebalancing policies ........................................................48
 4.2  Is rebalancing embedded in economic development?
What is the role of policy? .....................................................................50
 4.3 The politics of rebalancing .....................................................................52
References ....................................................................................................54
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 8 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1301
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The sustainability of China’s economic growth is a key element of the global outlook. There is a 
widespread consensus, including in China, that the producer-biased growth model which still 
prevails in the country is unsustainable in the long run. While the jury is out as to the time frame, 
it is widely acknowledged that a failure to implement more ambitious economic reforms would 
involve a tail-risk scenario of sluggish output performance, widespread corporate defaults, 
systemic banking sector stress and social unrest. This would bring about sizeable negative 
spillovers to the global economy. A critical mass of measures capable of further restructuring the 
Chinese economy would, on the other hand, ensure robust and less volatile long-term growth. 
Such measures would also entail the stronger monetary and fi nancial integration of China into 
the global economy, with signifi cant implications for the international monetary system and the 
euro area in particular.
Against this backdrop, we provide a detailed analysis of the “imbalances” (to be 
understood here not only as excessive current account surpluses, but along with a much 
broader defi nition) embedded in the Chinese growth model and the challenges they present. 
We then focus on the medium-term economic prospects of China by assessing the evolution of 
the core drivers of growth. Lastly, we explore the complex set of incentives behind rebalancing 
policies. Our main conclusions can be summarized as follows:
1.  Economic imbalances are an inherent by-product of the still prevailing producer-
biased and export-led growth model. While this framework has been successful in 
modernising China’s economy, boosting GDP per capita and gaining export market 
shares, it has produced domestic and external imbalances which are associated 
with economic ineffi ciencies, fi nancial stability risks, social unrest and tensions with 
major trading partners. These imbalances include a share of investment over GDP 
which is too high, a private sector which is still too small, a relatively weak services 
sector, fi nancial repression, rising income inequality and ineffi ciencies in the use of 
production factors – all features that cannot be redressed without a fundamental 
overhaul of the current growth model.
2.  Given the lack of a critical mass of economic reforms so far, macroeconomic 
imbalances are likely to at least partly re-emerge once global and domestic economic 
conditions normalise. The recent partial unwinding of current account imbalances 
has to some extent been also due to temporary factors, such as weaker global 
demand, policy stimuli to increase domestic demand and administrative measures 
implemented in the property sector, rather than a basic change in the underlying 
economic incentives. In the absence of decisive policy action, distortions and risks 
may start escalating again.
3.  The fundamental factors underpinning growth in China are likely to remain 
supportive, at least over the medium run. Although this could help mitigate the 
economic costs of imbalances for some time to come, it could also reduce the 
incentives for policy-makers to enact much needed reforms. While the period 
of double-digit growth is over, we view China’s recent economic slowdown as 
largely cyclical. China’s potential growth is set to decelerate gradually and we do 
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not expect a sharp downward adjustment to occur. A number of factors are likely 
to continue to support extensive and relatively robust growth. On the supply side, 
capital stock per capita remains low, industrial profi t margins remain high and rural 
labour supply is still abundant; at the same time, inward foreign direct investment 
into the mainland areas, efforts to lower the costs of migration and the share of 
highly sophisticated exports thanks to imported technology via multinational 
companies are all increasing. On the demand side, there is less vulnerability to 
external demand fl uctuations than is widely perceived. Overall, sustained growth 
could help to manage the costs of renewed imbalances, at least in the medium 
run. It could partly compensate for the losses stemming from ineffi cient resource 
allocation, help the fi nancial sector to outgrow its stock of non-performing loans 
and mitigate social unrest despite rising income inequality.
4.  Nonetheless, as potential growth gradually slows, imbalances will be more diffi cult 
to manage. In this context, postponed economic reforms and the persistence of 
the growth cum imbalances model would increase the risk of China getting caught 
in the middle-income trap. As is the case for other catching-up economies, China’s 
future growth perspectives are subject to multiple equilibria. Growth fuelled by the 
accumulation of inputs, sectorial reallocation, technological progress and low unit 
labour costs (extensive growth) will progressively erode and, therefore, China’s 
upgrading to the high-income status will depend increasingly on greater effi ciency in 
the use of production factors (intensive growth). Such a transition, however, cannot 
be accomplished without, for instance, enhanced market competition, suffi ciently 
developed fi nancial markets and a more skilled labour force. Therefore, China must 
succeed in shifting from extensive to intensive growth by overhauling its current 
model or risks eventually getting stuck in a sub-optimal, low-growth equilibrium.
5.  In the future, China is also likely to witness a “natural” shift in the composition 
of demand from investment and export towards domestic consumption. This 
implies that the most challenging policy test over the longer run will not be that of 
changing the composition of demand, but rather that of implementing structural 
reforms capable of ensuring a successful transition from extensive to intensive 
growth. A change in the composition of demand would be likely to materialise 
under both the middle-income-trap and the intensive-growth equilibria. Historical 
experience indeed suggests that the exhaustion of growth that relies on the 
accumulation of production inputs is coupled with a “natural” change in demand 
composition. This is because a decline in the marginal productivity of capital limits 
investment, the depletion of cheap rural labour increases wages, and the ensuing 
higher level of consumption – often coupled with population ageing – lowers the 
savings rate.
6.  In order to avoid the middle-income trap and secure sustainable economic growth, 
a bolder and more comprehensive set of domestic reforms is required in China. In 
a lower-growth environment:
 —  The corporate sector will have to operate with reduced profi t margins owing to 
the increased cost of capital and labour. Therefore, protected segments in the 
product market should be liberalised and deregulated, and price distortions 
eliminated.
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 —  Financial institutions will have to ensure a much more effi cient allocation of 
capital than is the case under the current “fi nancial repression” model, in 
an environment where price and information distortions may bring about 
signifi cant losses and fi nancial stability risks. Therefore, fi nancial markets 
should be liberalised further.
 —  The demand from large parts of the household sector for higher relative 
incomes and increased consumer spending will rise. Therefore, wider social 
security buffers and more intensive income redistribution should be pursued; 
this would also help avoid social unrest.
7.  From a macroeconomic policy management perspective, anchoring the exchange 
rate will become increasingly sub-optimal for monetary policy, since China’s 
economic conditions are just too different from those of any anchor country. It is 
therefore important not to repeat the “Japanese mistake” of trying to resist nominal 
exchange rate appreciation with prolonged and unsustainable monetary policy 
stimuli, which eventually fuel boom-bust cycles.
8.  In addition to efforts at the national level, multilateral cooperation may make its 
own contribution to setting the right incentives for China and its key global partners 
to rebalance. These incentives would have to be set in the multilateral context 
of the upgrading of the G20 as the principal world forum for policy impulse. In 
particular, the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth 
provides a promising mechanism for potentially fostering collective action at the 
global level. To reach this goal, all G20 members – and the European members 
primarily – should respect their global responsibilities and fully honour the pledges 
made, most recently, in Los Cabos and Mexico City in 2012. In the case of China, 
this includes commitments to, inter alia, further strengthening social safety nets, 
continuing to promote the liberalisation of interest rates and moving more rapidly 
towards greater exchange rate fl exibility and capital account liberalisation. In the 
absence of the latter preconditions, China will continue to be a global economic 
power without a strong global currency – an unprecedented case in history.
9.  The time has come for China to accelerate the implementation of its reform 
agenda. The Chinese authorities are well aware of the challenges ahead and have 
an ambitious reform agenda, as testifi ed by the11th and 12th fi ve-year plans. At 
the same time, political resistance and vested interests raise obstacles to the 
implementation of reforms. History suggests, however, that policy-makers should 
act pre-emptively. It is indeed very diffi cult, if not impossible, to recognise the 
deceleration of an economy’s underlying growth in real time. Structural policies, 
moreover, usually require several years to have a tangible impact on the economy 
and should therefore start being implemented well before risks to growth materialise.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper provides evidence that although the rebalancing of the Chinese economy has been 
making progress, it is nevertheless proceeding slowly. This is, of course, understandable. It is 
understandable that there is policy resistance to changing a model of growth that has delivered 
sustained high growth, growing GDP per capita and an impressive climb in world export market 
shares for the past thirty years, albeit at the cost of increasing internal and external imbalances. 
In addition, the slow pace of adjustment may imply genuine advantages over the short run. But 
it is also likely that it will imply longer-term costs, distortions and risks, given the gradual fading 
away of the longer-run supporting factors.
In order to make this point, the paper is structured as follows.
Section 1 takes a backward-looking perspective and briefl y summarises some of 
the main features of the growth model that has prevailed in China over the past thirty years. 
We characterise it as a model that has successfully delivered strong growth, but has also 
engendered, as a by-product, signifi cant imbalances that are embedded in the model itself. 
The notion of “imbalances” used in this paper is wide in nature, that is, we do not only refer to a 
share of investment over GDP which is too high. We also include, for instance, a private sector 
which is still too small, a relatively weak services sector, fi nancial repression, income inequality 
and, most importantly, the need to rebalance the model of growth towards greater effi ciency in 
the use of production factors.
Section 2 looks in detail into the present domestic and external imbalances and 
identifi es some of the costs, distortions and risks that they involve, such as those originating from 
excess reserve accumulation and exchange rate misalignment, monetary policy ineffi ciencies, a 
bias towards asset and housing price boom-busts, and excess lending from local government 
fi nancing vehicles.
Section 3 takes a forward-looking perspective and asks this central question: given 
the costs identifi ed in Section 2, how long will it take before the long-term factors that have 
been supporting the Chinese growth model run out? Our main conclusion is that a number of 
supportive factors will tend to make the current tensions in the Chinese economy still manageable 
in the medium run. Those very same factors, however, may provide grounds for policy-makers 
to postpone complex reforms that are much needed and should start being implemented now 
if they are to be fully effective when the supportive factors elapse.
Lastly, Section 4 briefl y takes stock of what the Chinese authorities have already done 
to rebalance their economy thus far. In this section, entitled “The thorny path to rebalancing”, 
we argue that the measures implemented thus far have been too gradual in nature, mainly 
on account of the prevailing short-term benefi ts of the existing growth framework and the 
considerable political resistance against its reform.
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1 LOOKING AT THE PAST: SUSTAINED GROWTH CUM IMBALANCES
Since the end of the 1970s, China’s policy-makers have had a system of incentives to maximise 
domestic economic growth by pursuing a well-identifi ed model of economic development. This 
model has proved successful in delivering, for instance, increasing GDP per capita, a substantial 
fall in poverty and major gains in world trade shares. Also as a result of this success, the 
Chinese authorities have thus far resisted or postponed any fundamental adjustment of their 
core economic strategy. However, the very same approach has implied, as a by-product, 
acquiescence vis-à-vis the accumulation of serious economic and social imbalances that were 
inherent to the growth model. This section briefl y elaborates on this interpretation.
1.1 CHINA’S SYSTEM OF POLICY INCENTIVES
Over the past three decades, the Chinese authorities have been pursuing a growth model, sometimes 
labelled “managed capitalism”, which can be seen as the outcome of a system of policy incentives 
that started maturing in the late 1970s. Given the country’s political and economic conditions at that 
point in time, the new Chinese leadership strived to shape the economy along a “producer-biased” 
model (Rajan 2010) led by investment and exports, where the direct support of the government to 
fi rms and a systematically undervalued exchange rate were integral parts of policy-making.
The main features of this model can be briefl y summarised as follows.
First of all, China was initially characterised by a total lack of the organisational structure 
necessary to deploy large quantities of physical capital effectively. For instance, the country was 
short of prepared management, reliable maintenance and marketing teams and an adequate 
supply of raw materials. In this context China, like many other countries in the early stages of 
development, has had an incentive to provide substantial government support to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) so that they could generate increasing profi ts around which they could over 
time build not only physical capital, but also the related organisational structure. This has taken 
the form, for instance, of: (i) “commanded” loans from the banking industry to SOEs and local 
governments, with policy-makers instructing banks whom to lend to; (ii) high reliance of SOEs on 
retained earnings; and (iii) the setting of very low deposit rates in order to artifi cially reduce the cost 
of credit andensure the profi tability of the banking sector.
Second, China could and still can rely upon huge domestic savings, which are used to 
fund domestic investments. Savings are explained in the mainstream literature as the outcome 
of four main drivers:
1.  Demographic factors. The dependency ratio (i.e. the ratio of people of non-working 
age to those of working age) has been falling from a high of around 80 dependents 
per 100 workers in the mid-1970s to below 40 today. This has implied that the 
number of people who are not able to save, but only to consume – the oldest and 
the youngest members of the population – has been decreasing in relative terms 
until recently (Ma and Wang (2010));
2.  High precautionary savings. Despite progress made, the health, pensions and 
education systems, to cite a few examples, are still in their infancy (Baldacci et. al 
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(2010), Barnett and Brooks (2010)). Factors such as a marked preference for home 
ownership have added to the household savings rate (Chamon and Prasad (2008));
3.  Corporate governance. The rising retained earnings of SOEs and a dividend policy 
that largely prevents SOEs’ wealth being shared by households are among the 
factors behind the unusually high corporate savings rate (Bayoumi et al. (2010);
4.  Financial underdevelopment. This has made it comparatively more diffi cult for 
households to borrow and for fi rms to receive market-based fi nancing (Aziz (2006), 
Aziz and Cui (2007), Dorrucci et al. (2009), Guo and N’Diaye (2010), N’Diaye 
(2010)). Both households and fi rms have thus been forced to save.
Third, rapid capital accumulation is used to promote the restructuring of the country’s 
abundant agricultural labour. Enhanced labour productivity due to massive fl ows of employment 
from agriculture to the more productive manufacturing and services jobs is the main driver of 
China’s economic growth. Moreover, the reserve army of workers keeps wages at moderate levels, 
providing a cost advantage in international comparison. This attracts foreign direct investment and 
ensures China’s access to the much needed technological innovation of advanced economies.
Fourth, as low wages hinder domestic consumption, external markets play an important 
role in absorbing excess supply. This strategy creates an incentive to keep the exchange rate 
undervalued over time. An undervalued exchange rate has entailed an implicit tax on consumption, 
which has been another factor fuelling the emergence of surplus savings channelled abroad via 
unconstrainedreserve accumulation, in a context characterised by a semi-closed capital account.
Fifth, at the international level it has been maintained that China’s domestic policy 
incentives have matched those, in particular, of the United States, thus leading to the emergence 
of the “Revived Bretton Woods” international monetary system, especially in the years following 
the Asian crisis of 1997-98 (Dooley et al. (2003)). The distinctive feature of this system has been 
the US issuance of liquid assets in which China could funnel its residual savings in return for 
easy fi nancing of the US current account defi cits (Dooley et al. 2003). Some have argued that 
this system of aligned policy incentives is basically still there (Dorrucci and McKay 2011), despite 
the fact that the US and Chinese growth models 
–based on over-consumption and over-savings, 
respectively – have been identifi ed as one of the 
factors contributing to the liquidity and savings 
glut which fuelled the credit boom that preceded 
the global fi nancial crisis.
1.2  WHAT DID CHINA’S GROWTH MODEL 
DELIVER?
The post-1978 model was successful in many 
respects. Starting with real GDP growth, it was 
usually above the “political threshold” of 8 % 
for a prolonged period and has outperformed 
growth in the previous (post-war) period, as 
Chart 1 shows. China’s GDP grew by 10 % on 
average per year during the 1990s and 2000s 
Chart 1 China’s real GDP growth
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and the country’s GDP is projected to grow by 8.6 % in the next fi ve years, according to the 
IMF. Chart 2 complements the picture by highlighting that, in terms of levels, China’s GDP is 
currently still less than 40 % of the US GDP in terms of market exchange rates (light red bars), 
but around two thirds of US GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms (dark red bars).
Chart 4 Poverty ratio
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Chart 2 Top ten GDP ranking relative 
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Chart 3 GDP per capita growth 
in selected economies 
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Alongside buoyant GDP growth, a 
huge (eightfold) increase in GDP per capita has 
taken place in the past three decades, although 
the scope for further increases remains equally 
huge, as Chart 3 suggests when looking at the 
red dots. In 2010, China’s GDP per capita in 
PPP terms was 16 % of the US and 22 % of 
the Japanese and euro area GDP per capita. 
Also, a major decrease in the poverty ratio – the 
share of the population whose income is less 
than $1.25 per day – has occurred. By 2008 
the poverty ratio had declined to 13 % from 
more than 80 % in 1981 (see Chart 4). China’s 
economic development managed to lift 672 
million people out of poverty during this period.
A gain in world market shares (defi ned 
as the imports of other countries in the world 
from China as a percentage of world imports) 
has been another key achievement, and is a 
result of comparatively higher export growth 
than prior to the start of the process of economic reforms (see Chart 5). In particular, China’s 
world market share has increased from below 1 % in 1980 to 9.1 % in 2010. China’s opening 
up also provides the country access to much needed advanced technology. Net FDI infl ows 
to China increased rapidly and by now account for almost 40 % of total FDI infl ows to low and 
middle income countries (see Chart 6).
1.3 DEFINING CHINA’S ECONOMIC IMBALANCES
China’s economic imbalances can be defi ned along several dimensions. First, there has been 
insuffi cient rebalancing from the public to the private sector. This is suggested by Chart 7, which 
shows that investment by SOEs still equals investment by domestic private enterprises and well 
exceeds investment by foreign-owned enterprises. In fact, the Chinese economy looks more 
“commanded” now than before the global crisis that started in 2007/08, with less room for 
manoeuvre for private sector activities. As a response to the global fi nancial crisis, investment 
has been allocated on the basis of central and local government guidelines, and mainly fi nanced 
through SOEs’ loans. Conversely, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), the main component 
of the private sector, have a more limited access to fi nance despite the lending expansion.
Second, there has been a lack of rebalancing towards private consumption, whose 
relative contribution to GDP growth reached historical lows in 2010, although it recovered 
slightly in 2011. Looking at the past twenty years, private consumption as a share of China’s 
GDP declined from almost half to around one third between 1990 and 2011 (Chart 9). However, 
contrary to common perceptions, China’s private consumption has been very dynamic over the 
same period, having grown at more than 8 % per annum (Ma, McCauley and Lam 2012). The 
imbalance rather consists in an abnormally high contribution of investment to growth, fuelled 
by exceptionally high savings. Chart 8 shows that investment tends to further increase in times 
of crisis – as was the case in 2009, when it was driven by public expenditure and commanded 
loans. In the 2009-11 period consumption contributed to China’s GDP growth by 4.3 percentage 
Chart 6 Inward FDI
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points, compared to the 4.8 percentage point pre-crisis average. Taking a longer time horizon, 
Chart 9 indicates that the share of investment in China’s GDP is abnormally high if compared 
with other emerging market economies (EMEs), and has been increasing since the 1990s to the 
detriment of the consumption share. China’s investment share reached 45 % by 2010, while the 
consumption share dropped below 35 %. The long-term trends have continued in very recent 
years, indicating that there has been no rebalancing of the two major demand components.
A third core imbalance has been excess 
reliance on the manufacturing sector for output 
growth, to the detriment of the services sector. 
The underdevelopment of the services sector is at 
the root of weak employment growth, as argued 
below, and indirectly is also responsible for the 
low wage share and subdued consumption 
growth in China.
Employment creation has been weak 
in the last decade or so, also as a result of 
China’s capitalintensive growth model. Despite 
GDP growing at above 10 % on annual average, 
employment increased by less than 1 % per 
annum in the 2001-10 period. This makes 
China a clear underperformer by international 
comparison (see Chart 10)1. In parallel, there has 
Chart 7 Investment by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) vs. private 
investment by domestic ??ms 
and foreign-owned enterprises
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Chart 9 Household consumption vs. 
investment: Shares in China 
and other EMEs
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1  Actual employment growth is underestimated by offi cial 
statistics, which do not take the sizeable underemployment 
level in the agricultural sector into account.
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been labour reallocation across the major sectors. Since 1990, approximately 100 million people 
have left the agricultural sector, and 130 million have moved from the countryside to the cities. The 
redundant agricultural labour force has been largely absorbed by the services sector. While there 
has been some fl uctuation in the relative contribution of the various sectors to overall employment 
creation, in total the services sector has created around 150 million jobs since 1991, almost 
twice as many as manufacturing. This clearly indicates that services are more labour intensive 
than manufacturing, and that a signifi cant output shift from the manufacturing to the services 
sector would help spur employment growth in China. However, three main factors hinder this shift, 
as argued in Box 1: the undervalued exchange rate, the lack of a broad-based social security 
system, and fi nancial underdevelopment. As a result, the share of employment in the services 
sector out of total employment was only slightly above 30 % in China at the end of 2010. This is 
very low by international comparison, even when China’s low GDP per capita level is taken into 
account (see Chart 11).
Chart 10 Employment vs. GDP growth
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Box 1
COULD AN APPRECIATION OF THE RENMINBI’S EXCHANGE RATE INCREASE THE 
SHARE OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE SERVICES SECTOR?
Guo and N’Diaye (2009a) argue that one explanatory factor of the low share of services 
employment in China is its undervalued exchange rate. In their view, while the Chinese 
authorities resist substantial and long-lasting exchange rate appreciation on the ground 
that it would harm job creation in the manufacturing sector, they tend to largely overlook the 
potentially positive impact of exchange rate appreciation on employment in the services sector.
Historical evidence based on a 66-country panel in the 1983-2007 period indeed confi rms 
that exchange rate misalignment has a signifi cant impact on services employment: countries 
with undervalued exchange rates tend to have lower services employment shares (Özyurt 
and Pula (2012); see the table above).
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A fourth imbalance-creating factor embedded in the Chinese model is known as 
“fi nancial repression” (Lardy 2008). This materialises, at fi rst sight, as forced lending by banks 
to SOEs and local governments. A more thorough examination, however, reveals that bank 
depositors have been de facto subsidising the banking industry and the government, which 
In addition to the exchange rate, 
there are several country-specifi c 
factors explaining the country’s low 
services employment share. There 
are two services sub-sectors in 
which China mainly underperforms 
in comparison with the other 
BRICs and advanced economies: 
(i) education, health and social 
security; and (ii) the fi nancial sector, 
including its capability of funding 
investment in the real estate sector. 
In China, these sectors account 
for about 20 % of GDP, whereas in 
Brazil and India the share is around 
35 %. The other major export-reliant 
economies in the region, such as 
Japan and Korea, have experienced 
a signifi cant transfer of labour to 
services alongside their development 
path. In Japan in th e 1970s and Korea 
in the 1980s, the above-mentioned 
services sub-sectors had shares 
similar to China today, but then these 
shares grew in size dramatically, and 
in 2010 they accounted for 41 % 
and 31 % of GDP respectively (see 
the chart above for a comparison 
with Japan). These fi gures suggest 
that the lack of a broad-based 
social security system and the 
absence of deep fi nancial markets 
are the two key additional factors 
that explain China’s underdeveloped 
services sector and its low services 
employment share.
All in all, we can conclude that the 
appreciation of China’s exchange rate would help increase the employment share in 
the services sector, but in conjunction with other structural policies. In particular, policy 
measures that aim at economic rebalancing through the strengthening of the services 
sector should also encompass reform of both the social security system and the domestic 
fi nancial market.
Determinants of services employment share
(panel estimates 66 countries, 1983-2007)
Dependent Variable: 
Services Sector 
Employment Share (I) (II)
Constant 2.18*** 2.40***
(8.13) (7.98)
GDP per capita (PPP) 0.07*** 0.02
(4.68) (1.1)
Relative Productivity -0.33*** -0.32***
(-11.13) (-10.56)
Undervaluation (USD) -0.09*** -0.08***
(-3.89) (-3.45)
Urbanisation 0.26*** 0.27***
(3.3) (3.21)
Tertiary Education - 0.05***
(-2.55)
R-square overall 0.48 0.42
F-probability 0 0
Number of Countries 66 64
Number of Observations 282 261
Source: Özyurt and Pula (2012).
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has resulted in a major redistribution of income from households to the other two sectors via 
artifi cially low deposit rates. This is a key cause of the insuffi cient level of consumption in China, 
because income is confi scated from households and directed into capital spending.
Financial repression became particularly apparent in the early 2000s as a by-product 
of the banking system reform and the government’s policy of maintaining an undervalued 
exchange rate. Its three main ingredients are: (i) interest rates set artifi cially low in relation to 
China’s economic growth (see Chart 13), which also makes it easier to roll over the related 
debt; (ii) a large spread between lending and deposit rates, which sustains banks’ profi tability 
to the detriment of an ineffi cient allocation of capital; and (iii) a very gradual development of 
fi nancial markets, which helps maintain a stable deposit base in the banks at the expense of very 
limited investment and fi nancing alternatives. The relatively low interest rate environment2 also 
contributes to lower portfolio infl ows than would otherwise be the case, thereby contributing to 
exchange rate undervaluation and reduced central bank sterilisation costs.
Chart 12 illustrates fi nancial repression by evidencing: (i) the very low real deposit and 
lending rates in China, on average (with one-year real deposit rates often close to zero); and (ii) the 
setting by the People’s Bank of China (PBC) of benchmark nominal interest rates on bank deposits 
and loans, which remains an important instrument to shield the margins of commercial banks. 
Since the amount of household deposits is around fi ve times higher than the amount of their bank 
borrowing, there is a de facto redistribution of income from households to other sectors of the 
economy. An attempt to estimate the extent of this redistribution is presented in Box 2.
Chart 12 Real and nominal deposit and 
lending interest rates in China
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Chart 13 Real GDP growth and real 
long-term interest rates, 
average 2001-09
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2  The PBC suspended its program of interest rate liberalisation in the fourth quarter of 2004.
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Income redistribution produced by fi nancial repression should be seen as part of a 
broader rise in income inequality – another by-product of China’s growth model. Although the 
Chinese authorities have not been releasing offi cial data since 2000, the World Bank estimates 
that currently the Gini index may be as high as 45-50, which is one of the highest in Asia, well 
above the index of India (30) or Japan (25) and closer to Brazil (55) and other Latin American 
countries3. Charts 14 and 15 not only show that urban income per capita has been growing more 
quickly than rural incomes, but also that the rise in urban income per capita has mainly been 
Box 2
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL REPRESSION ON INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION IN CHINA
Lardy (2008) defi nes fi nancial repression as a very low or even negative real return on 
household deposits. One way to measure it is to look at the differential between the 
nominal interest rate households receive on net savings deposits and the rate of consumer 
price infl ation. A decline in the real return on savings deposits can be interpreted as an 
implicit tax imposed on households. Lardy’s approach is to estimate how much higher 
household interest income would have been if households had received the same real 
interest rate on their net renminbidenominated savings deposits as in 2002. With the 
same methodology he also analyses who benefi ted from the implicit tax on households 
among corporates, banks and the government.
By 2008, the implicit tax imposed on 
households had reached around 4 % 
of GDP. In the same period (2002-08), 
banks and corporates benefi ted from 
the low-interest-rate environment at an 
estimated amount of 1 % and 0.9 % of 
GDP respectively. Yet the government 
and the central bank benefi ted the 
most, thanks to a dramatic reduction in 
the cost of sterilising FX interventions by 
issuing government bills (2.2 % of GDP). 
In the chart above, we replicate Lardy’s 
approach by computing the implicit tax 
on households in the period 2002-11, 
and estimate that it was over 2.5 % per 
year on average in that decade.
An important caveat in this analysis, 
however, is that there is no evidence that 
the interest rates paid by each economic agent in 2002 were close to the equilibrium rates. 
There may also be additional factors behind low real deposit rates.
Implicit tax on households
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3  The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals 
or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 0 represents perfect 
equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. The threshold above which income distribution starts raising 
concerns is usually considered to be around 40.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1301
driven by the highest income group, whereas the lowest incomes have remained relatively fl at. 
While rising income inequality has been associated with economic development and increasing 
GDP per capita, it has also been related to certain characteristics of the Chinese growth model, 
such as the underdevelopment of services, excess rural labour, and the limited redistribution of 
income by the government. Increasing tensions between the top and bottom income groups 
may exacerbate social confl ict if the problem is underestimated. This may further escalate in the 
future, eventually hindering economic development in China.
Last but not least, on the supply side Chinese growth has been fuelled by the 
accumulation of inputs, sectorial reallocation, technological progress and low unit labour costs 
(extensive growth), a the detriment of increasingly greater effi ciency in the use of production 
factors (intensive growth). We will come back on this issue in Section 3.
Chart 14 Income per capita
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Chart 15 Urban income per capita
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2  LOOKING AT THE PRESENT: THE IMPLICATIONS OF EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC 
IMBALANCES
In this section we analyse the implications of China’s external and domestic imbalances more 
thoroughly. We focus on two related questions: (i) to what extent imbalances undermine the 
sustainability of the current growth model; (ii) why some of the imbalances have receded 
lately, and whether we can expect them to re-emerge again. Regarding the future evolution of 
imbalances, we argue that the recent decline in the current account surplus, FX intervention, 
the investment share, or even the stabilization of property prices, are to a signifi cant extent due 
to a combination of temporary factors, such as weaker global demand, the partial withdrawal 
of domestic policy stimuli, and sector specifi c administrative measures. Imbalances are a by-
product of the Chinese growth model, and, as long as the underlying economic incentives 
remain unchanged, they will tend to persist.
Would a renewed escalation of imbalances bring the export-led and produce-biased 
growth model to an end? Not necessarily, or, at least, not in the short run. As our analysis points 
out, the Chinese authorities have been successful in managing the economic costs of domestic 
and external imbalances in the past, mainly on account of robust growth and the centralised 
macroeconomic management system. As long as these factors prevail, the Chinese model can 
be sustained.
2.1 TENSIONS ON THE EXTERNAL FRONT
2.1.1 THE CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS
While China had been accumulating large external surpluses since 2004, following the global 
shock triggered by the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008 the current account surplus 
started to shrink. By 2011, the current account surplus was 2.7 % of GDP, well below the peak 
of 10.3 % reached in 2007. The Chinese authorities have welcomed this development, claiming 
that China has made a substantial contribution to more balanced and sustainable growth in the 
global economy.
However, available evidence suggests that a signifi cant part of the decline in China’s 
current account surplus may be due to temporary factors. Such a decline can indeed be largely 
explained by four main drivers: the cyclical movement in external demand, strong commodity 
demand due to a surge in investment, unfavourable evolution of the terms of trade and the 
appreciation of the exchange rate. Out of these factors, strong commodity demand and the 
deterioration in the terms of trade seem to have been the most important. Ahuja et al. (2012) 
estimate that the terms of trade deterioration and the increase in investment demand explained 
–3.8 and –2.6 percentage points (p.p.) respectively, of the total –7.3 p.p. decline in China’s 
current account per GDP ratio between 2007 and 2011. The role of external demand and the real 
effective exchange rate was more muted, but still signifi cant, at –1.4 and –1.3 p.p. respectively.
All in all, these factors are considered to be, to a large extent, temporary in nature. An 
analysis of the trade balance by main product categories indicates that China’s non-commodity 
trade surplus, which includes both heavy and light manufacturing goods, has exceeded its 
pre-crisis level by now, following a temporary crisis-related weakness (see Chart 16). The 
stimulus-related acceleration of public infrastructural investments, which triggered the upsurge 
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in commodity demand, is expected to weaken in the future, in line with the authorities’ intention 
to move away from investmentdriven, material-intensive growth. Along with the country’s 
economic development productivity, differentials between the tradable and non-tradable sectors 
are also expected to decline, thus providing less room for future appreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate4.
Taking the perspective of the savings-investment balance, data available up to 2010 
indicate that the current account surplus has been reduced via an increase in investment rather 
than a drop in savings (see Chart 17). The increase in the investment ratio refl ects in turn the 
impact of the major policy stimulus enacted in 2008-09. This set of measures was needed 
because China is always at risk from the materialisation of excess capacity, and the impact of 
the “Lehman shock”, coupled with the burst of a domestic housing bubble, was so big that 
in the absence of strongly countercyclical macroeconomic measures a signifi cant output gap 
would have materialised. The lack of adjustment in the savings ratio points, conversely, to the 
limited success of the authorities’ policy efforts to increase the share of domestic consumption 
over GDP. With the withdrawal of the policy stimulus and in the absence of major changes in the 
savings pattern of domestic agents, China’s current account surplus would likely re-emerge in 
the coming years.
There is no clear evidence of a critical mass of rebalancing measures so far either. As 
will be discussed in greater detail in Section 4, although reforms in relation to social security, 
labour markets and social housing have been making some progress, they are advancing slowly. 
Taking into account that structural measures may need several years to have a long-lasting 
impact on the saving behaviour of households, the recent reform measures are likely to have 
played only a limited role in reducing China’s current account surplus, especially since most of 
Chart 17 Savings and investment shares
(percentage of GDP)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
S-I BALANCE (RIGHT-HAND SCALE)
CONSUMPTION
SAVINGS
INVESTMENT
Source: IMF WEO.
Chart 16 Current account and trade 
balance, price adjusted
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4  One development that may have a more permanent downward impact on China’s current account surplus could be the 
deterioration of the terms of trade in the event that factors such as the very strong demand for commodities stemming 
from emerging economies keep their prices elevated over a longer horizon.
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them only came into force in 2008 or later. This, once again, suggests that structural factors 
played only a limited role in China’s current account adjustment.
2.1.2 FX RESERVE ACCUMULATION AND ITS COSTS
Another indicator of external imbalances is the rapid accumulation of China’s FX reserves, 
which testifi es for the sizeable (one-sided) exchange rate interventions aiming to prevent the 
appreciation of the renminbi. Here we argue that: (i) the level of FX reserves is well above what 
can be justifi ed by a precautionary motive and (ii) that excessive FX reserve accumulation 
introduces distortions and risks to the global economy on the one hand, and entails signifi cant 
opportunity costs for the Chinese economy on the other.
In September 2012, China’s FX reserves had reached USD 3.3 trillion and were 70 % 
above their pre-crisis level (see Chart 18 for a crosscountry comparison). Interestingly, in contrast 
to most other emerging economies, even the global fi nancial crisis failed to reverse the process of 
reserve accumulation in China, as FX reserves decreased by only 0.2 % at the peak of the crisis, 
i.e. in the period from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the fi rst quarter of 2009. As a result of strong 
capital outfl ows, FX reserve accumulation has come to a halt more recently (see Chart 19), but 
once the global economic and fi nancial conditions normalise, the pace of FX reserve accumulation 
can be expected to pick up again.
FX reserves in China are well above the levels widely considered optimal in the available 
literature (see Chart 21), and this is diffi cult to explain in terms of purely precautionary motives. 
Also, while the size of FX reserves have helped emerging economies to weather the negative 
impact of the global crisis and mitigate capital fl ow retrenchment (Fratzscher (2009)), FX reserve 
accumulation has its own costs, both domestically and globally (see Table 1 for a summary).
Chart 18 Foreign exchange reserves 
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An important opportunity cost of 
reserve accumulation is given by the fact that 
China and, more generally, the Asian economies 
are the main counterpart, with negative sign, 
to the “exorbitant privilege” which the United 
States enjoys as the issuer of an international 
currency and as the main fi nancial centre 
of the world (Habib 2010). The exorbitant 
privilege can be measured, in the simplest 
way, by the positive difference between the 
real (i.e. defl ated with domestic CPI) return on 
foreign assets that is enjoyed by US residents 
investing abroad and the real return on US 
liabilities that is paid to foreigners investing into 
the United States. Following this defi nition, the 
balanceof-payments income balances show 
that: (i) the exorbitant privilege of the United 
States averaged around 1.5 percentage points 
in the period 1990-2008; and (ii) several Asian reserve accumulators experienced a “negative” 
differential between real returns on foreign assets and returns on foreign liabilities (see Chart 
22, left-hand side).
Chart 21 Foreign reserve adequacy ratios vs. actual reserves in emerging economies (2011) 
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When including the capital gains stemming from asset price movements and exchange 
rate changes5, the excess return on net foreign assets of the United States surged to almost 
5 % in the period 1999-2008. The capital losses of Asian reserve accumulators were, conversely, 
particularly large in those years (see the dark blue bars in Chart 22, right-hand side). This was due 
to negative valuation effects caused by (i) the relative underperformance of offi cial investment in 
low yield foreign assets, as confi rmed by the negative differentials from the income balance in 
Chart 22 on the left-hand side; and (ii) the inevitable real exchange rate appreciations. Although 
resisting such appreciations by means of foreign exchange interventions can reduce losses over 
the short run, it exacerbates the problem over the longer run.
2.1.3 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
China’s exchange rate policy is a key element of the existing growth framework. While a faster 
renminbi appreciation should not be seen as a panacea for all economic woes, it has implications 
for almost all the external and domestic elements of China’s economic imbalances. In this 
section we provide a detailed description of the exchange rate system. We argue that its design 
still lacks the fl exibility needed to ensure the renminbi’s alignment with its equilibrium value. 
Once global economic and fi nancial conditions normalise, appreciation pressures are expected 
to return. Resistance to these pressures will again complicate monetary policy management 
and fuel external and domestic imbalances. Promoting stronger exchange rate fl exibility is 
the starting point in the series of measures that are necessary to ensure the sustainability of 
economic growth in the long run.
De jure, since the 21 July 2005 reform China’s exchange rate system has been (i) a 
managed fl oating system, (ii) based on market supply and demand, (iii) with a reference to a basket 
of currencies. The PBC stated in 2005 that the basket was mainly composed of the US dollar, 
5  The United States indeed benefi ts from currency depreciation, which does not affect its USD-denominated liabilities but 
increases the value of foreign currency denominated assets.
Table 1 Distortions, risks and costs of reserve accumulation
Distortions, risks and costs
Global level Reserve accumulation corresponds to a large-scale re-allocation of capital ? ows organised by the public 
sector of the accumulating countries. This produces major distortions in the global economy and 
international ? nancial markets and can have negative implications for:
(i) global liquidity conditions, by possibly contributing to an arti? cially low yield environment 
(ii) the potential for build-up of asset price bubbles, to the extent that reserve accumulation is not 
suf? ciently sterilised 
(iii) global exchange rate con? gurations, including the risk of misalignments 
(iv) trade ? ows, to the extent that reserve accumulation becomes the equivalent of a protectionist 
policy subsidising exports and imposing a tariff on imports 
Regional level Reserve accumulation by a major economy in one region may contain currency appreciation 
in competitor countries in the same region when this is needed. This: 
(i) constrains the degree of ? exibility of the other currencies in the region, 
(ii) may magnify capital ? ow volatility in the other region’s economies in a context of misaligned 
exchange rates  
Domestic level Reserve accumulation can: 
(i) undermine a stability-oriented monetary policy if the monetary policy of the anchor country 
is more expansionary than domestically required 
(ii) hamper the market-based transmission of monetary policy impulses and the development 
of the domestic ? nancial market 
(iii) be costly  as reserves have a relatively lower return and involve sterilisation costs 
(iv) distort resource allocation, impede service sector development and constrain consumption  
and employment by unduly favouring the tradable sector at the detriment of the non-tradable sector 
(v) affect income distribution and consumption growth by unduly damaging the household sector 
as a result of arti? cially low interest rates on deposits in a ? nancially underdeveloped economy
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the euro, the Japanese yen and the South Korean won. However, the weights are undisclosed. 
Overall, the de jure system should allow for a high level of inter-day and intra-day fl exibility.
De facto, however, the renminbi exchange rate has been strictly managed against the 
US dollar. The accumulation of FX reserves is a clear sign of one-sided FX market interventions. 
Moreover, the observed co-movements of the renminbi with the US dollar imply that the dollar’s 
actual share in the hypothetical basket is above 90 % (see Chart 23). The fact that the intra-day 
volatility in the renminbi/dollar exchange rate, with very rare exceptions, does not exceed the limits 
of the daily fl uctuation band (see Chart 24), suggests that the PBC actively conducts intra-day 
Chart 22 Difference between real returns on foreign assets and foreign liabilities 
in selected economies
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Chart 23 Implicit weight of the US dollar 
in the renminbi basket
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interventions on the FX market. Inter-day interventions are also visible in certain periods. In 
particular, between July 2008 and June 2010 the PBC kept the closing price and the central 
parity at the same level within each day and, by doing so, also fi xed the RMB/USD inter-day rate.
The renminbi’s de facto exchange rate system has in our view two main shortcomings: 
(i) the renminbi is managed vis-à-vis the US dollar and little attention is paid to its nominal 
effective rate and (ii) the system creates the possibility of one-sided bets against the renminbi, 
thereby inducing speculative capital infl ows and making monetary policy management 
more diffi cult.
Given that the renminbi is managed against the US dollar, its appreciation in effective 
terms is just a side effect of the evolution of the dollar’s bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis other 
major currencies, in particular the euro. Between July 2005 and July 2012 the renminbi’s CPI-
based real effective exchange rate appreciated by a cumulative 27 %, or by 4 % per annum. This 
is a substantial appreciation and, with the current account surplus-to -GDP ratio dropping and 
exchange rate appreciation expectations moderating, the Chinese authorities see the renminbi as 
being fairly valued today. However, the signifi cant appreciation of the renminbi should be assessed 
against China’s steadily appreciating equilibrium rate estimated at 2 % per annum (Cheung et 
al., 2007). Moreover, half of the renminbi’s 27 % real effective appreciation between July 2005 
and June 2012 occurred in the last 12 months, mainly due to a strong depreciation of the euro 
against the US dollar. The authorities’ main policy target, the exchange rate of the renminbi against 
the dollar, has instead been kept stable since August 2011, indicating that the real effective 
appreciation of the renminbi was largely unintentional.
Owing to the steady appreciation pressures on the renminbi until recently, the system has 
also provided a one-way bet against the exchange rate, inducing speculative capital infl ows and 
hampering the effectiveness of monetary policy. Historically, the magnitude of PBC interventions is 
positively related to the pace of appreciation of the renminbi vis-à-vis the US dollar. An increasing 
pace of appreciation enhances appreciation expectations, which boost “speculative” infl ows and, 
in turn, larger PBC interventions. Under the current regime, monetary policy independence is 
hindered by the lack of exchange rate fl exibility.
Since end-2011 appreciation pressures on the renminbi have declined, thereby allowing for 
greater two-way volatility in the renminbi’s bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar. Appreciation 
expectations have moderated signifi cantly, which has contributed to a reversal of capital infl ows. 
To the extent that these capital fl ows are driven by increased risk aversion and expectations that 
the authorities hold off the renminbi’s appreciation until external demand is recovered, the decline 
in appreciation pressures can be considered only temporary. A resurgence of capital infl ows would 
force the authorities to resume the appreciation of the renminbi, which, if done under the current 
regime in a gradual and predictable way, would fuel appreciation expectations and induce further 
capital infl ows.
Besides eliminating the possibility of one-way bets, greater exchange rate volatility is 
also necessary to promote the development of foreign exchange markets and increase the 
ability of private agents to hedge against FX risk. In general, a more fl exible exchange rate 
regime would ensure that the renminbi fl uctuates around its long-term equilibrium value, which 
would be benefi cial for both the domestic and the global economy. It would enable a more 
effi cient management of domestic liquidity conditions. It would help rebalance the Chinese 
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economy by boosting the purchasing 
power of households and eliminating the 
price disadvantage in the services sector. It 
would also promote the development of the 
domestic fi nancial sector and be a necessary 
pre-requisite for China opening up its fi nancial 
account. Finally, a more fl exible exchange 
rate could make a signifi cant contribution to 
the orderly unwinding of global imbalances, 
also indirectly via the de facto role which the 
renminbi plays as a shadow anchor currency 
in Asia. Evidence indeed suggests that after 
2008 other Asian countries maintained their 
competitiveness against China by implicitly 
pegging their currencies to the renminbi 
(Fratzscher and Mehl (2011)). Consequently, 
China’s exchange rate policy has widespread 
effects on exchange rate developments in the 
whole emerging Asian region (see Chart 25).
2.1.4 CAPITAL CONTROLS AND THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF THE RENMINBI
The closed capital account is also a source of signifi cant tension. Capital controls are necessary 
to (i) secure that domestic savings do not fl ee abroad despite low real returns enforced by 
fi nancial repression, and (ii) to ensure that domestic liquidity conditions are set freely under 
the fi xed exchange rate regime. Capital controls, however, hinder competition and prevent the 
much-needed deepening of domestic fi nancial markets. To ensure a more effective allocation of 
fi nancial resources, capital controls need to be relaxed.
The closed capital account is also at odds with the authorities’ objective of achieving 
a large degree of internationalisation of the renminbi. The strategy of internationalisation of the 
renminbi via its promotion in offshore markets allows the Chinese authorities to experiment 
with fi nancial market reforms. This promotes a wider international use of the renminbi in a 
controlled manner, without exposing the domestic markets to global fi nancial fl ows. Although 
the authorities opened onshore inter-bank bond markets to foreign central banks and renminbi 
trade settlement clearing banks, cross border fl ows between the offshore and onshore markets 
remain closely managed.
With capital controls in place, the authorities expect to face increasing challenges in the 
process of internationalising the renminbi. The core limitation in the current international use of 
the renminbi is the very small size of, and limited potential for, a deep offshore renminbi market. If 
the role of the renminbi is to be facilitated not only as a means of exchange and unit of account, 
but also as a store of value, a much wider access to the onshore market will have to be granted 
to foreign investors. In other words, a more open capital account remains the key precondition 
for the renminbi to become a widely used international currency. Lacking this precondition, 
China will continue to represent an unprecedented case in history, that is, the case of a global 
economic power without a strong global currency.
Capital account liberalization in turn requires further reforms. Historical experience 
suggests that the reform of the banking and fi nancial system is a crucial fi rst step in a series 
Chart 25 Co-movements of Asian 
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of measures to be taken with a view to fi nancial account liberalisation. Until the authorities 
fundamentally address the key reform areas of exchange rate and interest rate liberalisation 
coupled with domestic fi nancial market development, the international use of the renminbi is 
expected to remain limited in scope.
2.2 TENSIONS ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT
2.2.1 MONETARY POLICY INEFFICIENCIES
Given China’s system of incentives and the fact that 
its growth model has on the whole proved successful 
thus far, the macroeconomic policy framework 
underlying China’s monetary policy remains basically 
unchanged. The solution to the “Impossible Trinity” 
dilemma continues to consist of three mutually 
consistent pillars as depicted in Chart 26:
(i)  free trade with the rest of the world 
coupled with fi nancial repression in both 
the fi nancial account and the domestic 
fi nancial markets;
(ii)  exchange rate and monetary policy management aiming at a systematic 
undervaluation of the real effective exchange rate; and
(iii)  the pursuit of some degree of monetary policy autonomy through administrative 
measures and limited reliance on the interest rate channel in the mechanism of 
transmission.
However, anchoring the exchange rate has clearly become sub-optimal for monetary 
policy since the underlying emerging economy conditions are just too different from those of 
the anchor country. When the Chinese infl ation 
rate picks up (see Chart 27), and in the presence 
of a much higher growth rate than in the United 
States, this tends to fuel new waves of carry 
trades and search for yield, potentially fuelling 
new bubbles in fi nancial asset and property prices 
and increasing fi nancial fragility. The reserve 
build-up is often coupled with excess net portfolio 
infl ows, often referred to by Chinese policy-
makers as “speculative infl ows of hot money”. The 
authorities seek to resist appreciation by means 
of foreign exchange intervention. But this does 
not discourage – and in certain phases may even 
encourage, by preventing the emergence of two-
way risks and leading to one-way bets in local 
currency markets – the upsurge in speculative 
net portfolio infl ows. While China’s policy-makers 
claim that the problem lies in US monetary policy 
conditions, which they consider have been “too 
Chart 26 The macroeconomic policy 
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accommodative for too long”, it is also true that only local solutions can address the problem of 
these excess portfolio infl ows.
Moreover, there is ample evidence of phases when the extent and pace of reserve 
accumulation has made it increasingly diffi cult to sterilise the impact of foreign exchange 
intervention. Sterilisation, moreover, has its own costs.
Lastly, as insuffi cient sterilisation may eventually result in higher infl ation and/or asset 
bubbles, one way to prevent these risks from materialising has consisted, as shown in Chart 26, 
in the adoption of (i) capital controls to curb portfolio infl ows and/or (ii) administrative “quantitative” 
measures to contain money and credit growth. In theory and sometimes even in practice, this 
may make sense for some time (Ostry et al. 2010), though many questions arise with regard 
to what an effective and “not-too-distortionary” system of controls would look like. But when 
capital controls and the transmission of monetary policy via administrative measures become an 
intrinsic permanent feature of an economy, as in China’s case, the cost may become too high 
over the long run. The development of a modern fi nancial system is hampered, with negative 
implications for both resource allocation and also, eventually, fi nancial stability. Underdeveloped 
fi nancial markets are not capable of channelling savings into the most effi cient investments. 
And they are characterised by the inability of market participants to properly price assets and 
liabilities, potentially becoming even more speculative than in a context of developed and highly 
liquid markets. Over the long run, “fi nancial repression”, if not linked to liberalisation, creates more 
problems than solutions even from a fi nancial stability point of view, becoming one of the main 
sources of domestic fragility.
In June 2012, amidst lower domestic liquidity pressures caused by the reversal of capital 
fl ows, the People’s Bank of China slightly relaxed its control over retail interest rates by allowing 
banks to deviate more freely from the centrally set benchmark lending and deposit rates. In 
parallel, reverse repos have become the main instrument of short-term liquidity management, 
thus establishing a shift towards a more market-based monetary policy toolkit. These steps 
defi nitely go in the right direction, but their impact remains contained.
An illustration of monetary policy ineffi ciencies under a heavily managed exchange 
rate is given by Japan’s experience in the 1970s and 1980s. Japan’s “lost decade” was not 
only due to factors such as productivity slowdown, unfavourable demographics, labour market 
ineffi ciencies, a highly protected services sector and disruptions in fi nancial intermediation, 
but also to monetary policy failures. In the 1970s the Japanese authorities had resisted the 
appreciation pressures on the Japanese yen by means of increased sterilisation and expansionary 
policies. As a result, infl ationary pressures escalated and, therefore, Japanese CPI increased 
signifi cantly in the 1970s relative to its competitors (Box 3). In the second half of the 1980s, 
after the Plaza Accord, the same policy infl ated an asset price bubble, the burst of which was 
followed by a decade of economic stagnation.
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Box 3
REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE APPRECIATION: ADJUSTMENT VIA THE NOMINAL 
EXCHANGE RATE OR DOMESTIC INFLATION? LESSONS FOR CHINA FROM THE PAST 
EXPERIENCE OF JAPAN VS GERMANY
The Balassa-Samuelson effect predicts that in the longer run the real effective exchange 
rate (REER) has to refl ect productivity differentials between the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors. As such, the REER is, at least in principle, a variable that in the longer run is 
determined by the structural features of an economy, and cannot be infl uenced by short-
term policies. Policy-makers can only choose how they want to achieve the unavoidable 
REER adjustment: either (1) via adjustment of the nominal exchange rate, or (2) via 
adjustment of domestic infl ation.
The experience of Japan and Germany from the post-Bretton Woods period in the 1970s 
testifi es for this relationship. The Japanese authorities resisted the appreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate – exactly as China does today – but had then to accept adjustment 
via infl ation. Germany, on the other hand, allowed a nominal appreciation of the Deutsche 
Mark (DEM) as part of a tight monetary policy designed to pursue price stability.
The difference in approaches is illustrated in Chart 26, which can be read clockwise 
starting from the top left. All sub-charts compare Japan and Germany in the period 1971-
81 – that is, after the collapse of Bretton Woods – with developments in China after the 
exchange rate reform of 2005. At the top, one can see the REER and then, clockwise 
the local currencies’ bilateral exchange rates against the US dollar, the nominal effective 
exchange rate (NEER), and the implicit CPI relative to competitors. In all cases, downward 
movement indicates appreciation.
The fi rst chart shows that in the 1971-1981 period productivity growth differentials and 
other structural factors induced a signifi cant appreciation in REER terms of the Japanese 
yen (JPY), whereas there was a very muted appreciation of the REER of the DEM. 
However, in the third chart one can see that in the period 1973-77 the nominal effective 
appreciation of the JPY was weaker than that of the DEM, which shows the resistance 
of Japanese authorities to appreciation pressures. As a result of increased sterilization 
and expansionary policies, infl ationary pressures increased and, therefore, Japanese CPI 
increased signifi cantly in the 1970s relative to its competitors (fourth sub-chart). In Germany, 
on the contrary, the authorities allowed for a stronger appreciation of the currency in order 
to keep infl ation at low levels. As a result, Germany gained price competitiveness vis-à-vis 
its major competitors.
Coming back to China today, the question we are confronted with is: which path have the 
Chinese authorities been following since the 2005 reform; the Japanese or the German 
path of the 1970s? The answer which emerges from the charts is: China has been following 
the Japanese path.
This may entail some risks for the sustainability of China’s future economic growth. It is well 
known that at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s Japan kept interest rates very low, 
partly in order to prevent capital infl ows and a further appreciation of the yen, and partly 
to provide a monetary stimulus to offset the impact of losses in external competitiveness. 
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2.2.2 ASSET AND HOUSING PRICE BOOM-BUST CYCLES
In China, the stock and property markets tend, as Chart 28 suggests, to be subject to booms 
and busts, given both real interest rates that are systematically too low (fi nancial repression) 
and insuffi cient investment alternatives (fi nancial underdevelopment). Empirical evidence indeed 
confi rms that the loose monetary conditions have caused equity and property prices to rise 
above sustainable levels in the past (de Bondt et al. (2010), and Santabárbara (2011)). Such 
sharp asset and housing price movements may also affect the soundness of the banking 
In Japan, the low interest rate environment was an important factor that contributed to 
the asset price bubble and, as claimed by many, to the lost decade of the 1990s. In that 
sense the German policy model, i.e. adjustment via the nominal exchange rate, can be 
considered more successful. 
Our conclusion is that the Chinese authorities may risk drawing the wrong lessons from 
Japan’s experience. There is a widely held view in China that, fi rst, the mistake Japan 
made in the late 1980s and early 1990s was to strongly appreciate against the US dollar, 
and second, that China should not repeat that mistake (McKinnon (2006)). But according 
to a number of scholars the Japanese mistake was different: it was resisting appreciation 
for too long by keeping interest rates too low (Ito and Mishkin (2006), Corbett and Ito 
(2010)). This is precisely what the Chinese authorities have been doing. Unlike in Japan in 
the 1980s, price pressures in China are still dampened by a persistently negative output 
gap, but in a low growth environment increasing supply constraints are expected to make 
prices more responsive to domestic demand conditions.
Over the long run, the real effective exchange rate is determined by structural factors:  
policy-makers can only choose to adjust via either the nominal exchange rate or consumer 
price i???tion
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system. In this section we will mainly focus on housing prices, but partly similar considerations 
would also apply to the stock market.
The preferred approach of the authorities in tackling housing bubbles is to resort to 
administrative measures. Such measures, however, sometimes prove to be too “draconian” in 
nature, as was the case with the property market measures taken at the end of 2007, which 
turned out to be one of the drivers of the subsequent market bust themselves. In other cases, 
the measures adopted seem instead to have succeeded in smoothing market volatility, as may 
have been the case with the property market measures that were taken from the end of April 
2010 onwards. The policies implemented on that occasion helped stabilise housing prices at the 
time by restricting speculative demand while, at the same time, increasing social housing supply 
to sustain residential investment6.
The ultimate direct implications of a sharp decline in housing prices on activity could 
be very signifi cant in China, especially on the real side of the economy. The property market 
occupies a central position in the Chinese economy. The construction and real estate sectors 
account for 15 % of GDP and 25 % of total investment respectively. The impact on real economic 
activity stems from the strong linkages between the real estate sector and other industries. 
Real estate developments directly affect related industries such as construction, steel, cement, 
furniture, etc. In this context, the challenge authorities are confronted with is how to curb prices 
and speculation activity without impairing real activity. The most obvious way to pursue this 
objective is to offset any possible negative impact of restrictive administrative measures by 
extending investment in public housing.
On the fi nancial side, the impact of a housing bust tends to be more limited. First, bank 
mortgages (see Chart 29) still account for a relatively low share of total loans, i.e. approximately 
Chart 28 Stock and property prices
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6  Under its 12th Five Year Plan, the Chinese government plans to build up to 36 million houses.
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20 %. In the same vein, household indebtedness stood at only around 40 % of disposable 
income in 2010 (well below international standards), indicating that the main source of funding of 
housing purchases is not lending. Second, household mortgages (only 13 % of total loans) have 
been granted with an average loan-to-value ratio of below 50 %. This implies that the collateral 
is large enough to buffer major falls in prices. The riskiest activity is related to lending to property 
developers, which, however, accounts for less than 10 % of total lending.
Two factors, however, could amplify the fi nancial implications of a decline in housing 
prices. The actual overall exposure of banks could be larger than the direct exposure suggests, 
given the abovementioned linkages between the real estate sector and other industries. 
Moreover, a signifi cant share of total loans has been created by using properties as collateral, 
as in the case of loans provided to local government fi nancing vehicles. We will discuss this in 
greater detail in Section 2.2.3.
In order to determine the explanatory role of structural factors and policies in property 
market developments, thereby estimating the degree of misalignment of housing prices from 
their fundamentals, we model residential house prices across Chinese regions. The main fi ndings 
are summarised in Box 4.
Box 4
ARE PROPERTY PRICES 
OVERVALUED IN CHINA? 
EVIDENCE FROM 
A CROSS-REGIONAL MODEL
We model house prices as a function 
of structural determinants (income 
per capita and urbanization), fi nancial 
conditions (loans per capita, interest 
rates) and speculative behavior (lag 
of the log of stock of houses). The 
dependent variable considered is 
the implicit residential property price, 
measured as the value of sales divided 
per square metre sold. Speculative 
behaviour and inventories are taken into 
account by including the changes in the 
stock of houses in the previous period.
The results show that the structural 
determinants of the model explain 
the evolution of residential property prices in the Chinese regions reasonably well (see 
the Table and the Chart), but part of the increase in housing prices is also due to loose 
monetary conditions. Specifi cally:
—  Structural factors, namely disposable income growth and the urbanization process, 
accounted for a “natural” annual real growth of house prices by 6 % from the fourth 
Model estimates
(quarterly: Q4 2005-Q2 2011)
Dependent variable: 
Log implicit house price index GMM estimator
Log disposable income per capita 
1) 0.508***
(0.000)
Log ratio of urban population 0.815***
(0.001)
Log loans per capita 
1) 0.150***
(0.000)
Lending rate 
1) -0.0117***
(0.000)
Changes in the log stock of houses (-1) -17.68**
(0.023)
Constant -2.784***
(0.000)
Observations 398
Number of regions 28
R2 0.71
Hansen test (0.809)
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Notes: Regions ? xed effects are also included. All variables 
are expressed in real terms.
Robust p values in parentheses.
* signi? cant at 10%; ** signi? cant at 5%; *** signi? cant at 1%
1) These variables are instrumented with the ? rst lag.
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2.2.3 THE LINK BETWEEN FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
From a fi nancial stability perspective, a major concern is that the surge in domestic loans to fi nance 
investment in infrastructure as part of the already mentioned stimulus package of 2008-10 could 
result in a surge in non-performing loans (NPLs) and, therefore, the contingent liabilities of the offi cial 
sector (see Box 5 for analytical detail).
Lending by local government 
fi nancing vehicles (LGFV) was an essential 
part of the stimulus package implemented 
from late 2008 to 2010. At the end of 
2008, as a substitute to public spending, 
the Chinese authorities urged – and even 
ordered – banks to fi nance investment 
plans, mainly in infrastructure. The bulk 
of such investment stemmed from local 
government (see Chart 30) and was 
fi nanced mainly through land-collateralised 
bank loans extended to around 10,000 
LGFV that had been created to circumvent 
the balanced budget constraint of local 
governments (see Chart 31). Such 
vehicles did not have offi cial backing from 
local government, but rather an implicit 
guarantee.
quarter of 2005-to the second quarter 
of 2011;
—  Financial markets and monetary con-
ditions also play a role in explaining 
house prices: higher access to lending 
and lower real interest rates signifi -
cantly drive prices up (by around 5 % 
annually in 2009 and 2010). Since 
mortgage fi nance is increasingly rel-
evant in China (see Chart 29), this 
channel is becoming more infl uential, 
especially in an environment of very 
low real lending and deposit rates;
—  In mid-2012, there was no clear sign 
of a nationwide property bubble, but 
property prices could have been 
overvalued by 10 % on average and 
several large cities, including Beijing 
and Shanghai, showed overvaluation exceeding 30 % (under the assumption that real 
disposable income and urbanization are the only structural drivers).
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According to the PBC, LGFV-related lending had reached RMB 14.4 trillion at the end 
of 2010 (36 % of 2010 GDP), whereas according to the National Audit Offi ce it accounted for 
only RMB 8.5 trillion, or 21 % of 2010 GDP. The difference between the two sources lies in the 
fact that the National Audit Offi ce only considers LGFV borrowing that is directly backed by local 
governments. If the central government were to recognise all LGFV borrowing, local government 
indebtedness and other liabilities, it is estimated that the public debt-to-GDP ratio could increase to 
as much as around 73 %, i.e. more than four times the offi cial fi gure (18 % in 2010; see Chart 32).
A major concern is that most of the 
loan growth in China has been associated with 
very loose credit standards, i.e. loan pricing 
that has not been properly assessed and 
implicit guarantees that are not enforceable. In 
addition, local governments – the entity ultimately 
responsible for such projects – have not improved 
their fi nances in the last few years (the balanced 
budget constraint has not been effective) and, 
therefore, might not be able to guarantee all LGFV 
liabilities. There are two reasons for this: fi rst, 
the expenses of local governments have been 
increasing not only as a result of infrastructure 
spending but also of wider provisions for health, 
education and pensions. Second, their revenues 
have become increasingly dependent on land 
sales, whose prices could be negatively affected 
by the 12th Five Year Plan, which aims to build 
36 million new affordable housing units. Given 
this situation, offi cial sources have reported that 
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26 % of LGFV loans will be very diffi cult to recover and another 50 % could only be paid back by 
using external sources of fi nance (see Chart 33).
While the lack of local government funds and the stimuli-driven nature of lending are 
at the root of current problems, it is unlikely that the burden will be borne by commercial banks 
alone. To avoid fi nancial and real spillovers, the central government could guarantee LGFV debts, 
provide local governments with additional resources or revenues or move debt from the balance 
sheet of commercial banks to that of a “bad bank”, as has happened in past restructuring 
waves. However, since China now has a more open and developed banking system than it did 
during previous banking crises, the materialisation of signifi cant NPLs would seriously damage 
the credibility of reform policies and the modernisation of the banking system.
Box 5
CAN CHINA OUTGROW ITS NON-PERFORMING LOANS? 
To determine the size of bad loans, García-Herrero & Santabárbara (2012) build three 
scenarios based on alternative assumptions on default loss rates and nominal GDP growth. 
The assumptions are as follows: the default ratio is assumed to range between 26 % and 
39 % of loans to LGFVs, in line with the fi gures reported by the Chinese authorities and 
with the default ratio observed after the 1997-98 Asian crisis. In addition, nominal GDP 
growth in the subsequent decade – which determines the basis for which the bad loans’ 
burden is reduced over time – is assumed to range between 9 % (no infl ationary pressures 
and low real GDP growth) and 16 % (infl ation and fast growth).
This simple exercise shows that, under non-extreme scenarios, the burden would be 
between 9 and 14 % of 2010 GDP. In any event, as has already happened in the past, the 
bad loans problem will shrink as a consequence of high nominal GDP growth. In 2020, the 
burden of new default loans is estimated to be around 2-4 % of GDP and the NPL ratio will 
have increased by 2 to 3 %. These fi gures are signifi cant, but manageable. Even under a 
more pessimistic scenario the new NPLs would be below 8 % of GDP in 2020, although 
such simple extrapolations may of course mask many signifi cant downside risks.
Impact of the loan ?nancing of the stimuli package
(RMB trillion, unless otherwise indicated)
???????????? Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
PBC National 
???????????
Optimistic Baseline Pessimistic
Assumptions
Recognized loans to LGFVs
(as of December 2010)
14.4 8.5 14.4 14.4 14.4
Default ratio (percentage of LGFV loans) 26% 26% 26% 39% 50%
Nominal GDP growth (2010-2020) 11% 11% 16% 13% 9%
Results
Loans default 3.7 2.2 3.7 5.5 7.2
New NPLs (percentage of 2010 GDP) 9.4 5.6 9.4 13.9 18.1
New NPLs (percentage of 2020 GDP) 3.3 2.0 2.1 4.1 7.6
?????????? ??????? 4.6 2.7 3.7 6.3 9.8
?????????? ??????? 2.8 1.6 1.8 3.4 6.3
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 39 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1301
3  LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ARE THE LONG-TERM FACTORS THAT HAVE BEEN 
SUPPORTING CHINA’S GROWTH RUNNING OUT?
In the previous section we argued that, given the lack of a “critical mass” of structural reforms, the 
recent decline in external and global imbalances is likely to prove only temporary, and imbalances 
are to re-emerge once global and domestic economic conditions normalise. Imbalances can be 
considered as losses to effi ciency, and as such, a drag on economic growth. Moreover, in a 
low growth environment these ineffi ciencies are more likely to create systemic shocks. In this 
respect, China’s growth outlook is a key element in assessing the sustainability of the export-led 
and producer-biased growth model.
Ultimately, China’s growth will decelerate as the economy gradually depletes its extensive 
sources of growth and transits to the phase of intensive growth. The question which remains 
regards the time horizon over which we can expect that to occur. China’s recent slowdown has 
led several analysts to conclude that the fundamental factors of growth are running out, capital 
investments are turning sour, the rural “cheap” labour force has dried up, FDI is moving out of 
the country, and export market shares have peaked. Based on our analysis, we hold a more 
optimistic view. We expect fundamental growth factors to remain supportive to growth in the 
foreseeable future, thus ensuring a smooth deceleration of growth in the medium run. In our 
view, robust growth can be as much of a blessing as a curse, as it could mask the increasing 
costs of imbalances and provide grounds for policy-makers to postpone much needed reforms.
In the last three decades, China’s sustained economic growth has been supported by 
three major domestic factors:
1.  robust capital accumulation, which is a feature of China’s investment and producer-
biased growth model; 
2.  a strong increase in labour productivity due to the migration of workers from the 
rural to the industrial sector, which also sustained downward pressure on wages 
and, therefore, unit labour costs; and 
3.  rapid total factor productivity (TFP) growth as a result of the progressive liberalization 
of the state-controlled economy after 1978.
Recent literature on growth accounting in China, for instance Kuijs (2009) and Park 
and Park (2010), sheds further light on the main determinants of China’s growth. Despite 
the commonly held view that China’s growth has been chiefl y driven by capital accumulation 
due to the high investmentto- GDP ratio, recent evidence suggests that TFP growth has also 
been playing an important role inmore recent years. According to Park and Park (2010), the 
contribution of TFP growth picked up dramatically in China after the Asian crisis and has been 
by far the most important factor behind economic growth since 20027 (see Table 2), although 
this conclusion has been questioned by other academics.
7  While Kuijs (2009) doesn’t give evidence for the strong TFP dynamics (the comparison is problematic due to the 
different time frame), his estimates also suggest a signifi cant contribution from TFP growth in the 1993-2009 period.
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The prominence of TFP growth as a driver of economic development is also observable 
in other emerging Asian economies, as Table 2 confi rms. Both in the more advanced newly 
industrialised economies (NIEs) and the developing economies in the region, the growth 
contribution originating from TFP was almost double the contribution from capital accumulation 
in the 2002-2007 period.
China’s TFP growth has two main determinants. First, it stems from labour productivity 
gains due to the shift of the workforce from the low productivity agricultural sectors to services 
and manufacturing. This factor is estimated by He and Kuijs (2007) to have accounted for 
40 % of China’s TFP growth in the 1978-2005 period. The remaining part of TFP growth 
can be ascribed to the gradual economic restructuring of China after 1978, with two major 
achievements: (i) the reform of SOEs starting in the mid-1980s and (ii) WTO accession in 
2002. While there is still plenty of room for market mechanisms to play a larger role in the 
economy, the marginal impact of further reforms is expected to decline in the future as pockets 
of ineffi ciencies recede. The potential for TFP increase via labour restructuring is also limited 
owing to the gradual depletion of cheap rural labour. Historical experiences and the anecdotal 
evidence on China’s accumulating overinvestment suggest that capital accumulation should 
weaken in the coming years, thus limiting China’s extensive sources of growth. The question, 
of course, is how abruptly this would happen, i.e. whether we should expect China’s growth to 
slow signifi cantly in the coming years. We look into this issue in the next sub-sections.
3.1 WILL CHINA CONTINUE TO OVER-INVEST?
Economic growth in China has been partly driven by an extensive build-up of capital. China’s 
investment-to-GDP ratio stood at 46 % in 2010, well above that of advanced economies or any 
other economies in the Asian region. While part of the recent increase in the investment share 
was due to the 2008-10 policy stimulus and, thus, is expected to be reversed in the short run, 
China’s rate of capital formation was already very high before the crisis by any international 
standards. Anecdotal evidence from certain segments of the economy (in particular steel 
and construction) suggests that China has been overinvesting in certain sectors. Historical 
experience with the industrialisation of other economies also tells us that the marginal return 
on capital diminishes as countries grow richer and accumulate more capital per worker. 
Japan’s investment-to-GDP ratio peaked at 36 %; that of Korea and the other NIEs reached 
its peak slightly below 40 % (see Chart 34). This raises the question of whether China’s 
capital accumulation is bound to slow in the near future, with the marginal return on capital 
diminishing rapidly.
Table 2  Contribution of capital, labour and TFP to GDP growth
(percentage points)
China NIEs Asian EMEs
Kuijs (2009) Park & Park (2010) Park & Park (2010)
1978-1994 1993-2009 1997-2002 2002-2007 2002-2007 2002-2007
GDP growth 9.9 9.6 7.7 12.2 5.5 6.6
Employment growth 3.3 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.5
Labour productivity growth 6.4 8.6 7.1 11.5 4.6 6.1
TFP growth 3.0 2.7 2.5 7.0 2.6 2.7
Human capital 0.5 0.3 1.0 0.4 0.5 05
Capital accumulation 2.9 5.5 3.5 4.3 1.5 1.4
Sources: Kuijs (2009), Park and Park (2010). 
Note: NIEs (Newly Industrialized Economies): Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan P.C, Asian EMEs: India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.
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Yet there are two main counter-arguments that support the view that China’s rapid capital 
accumulation may still be sustained for some time. First, China’s capital stock is still small relative 
to its population and economic development. Based on estimates by Dragonomics (2010), in 
2010 China’s capital stock per capita was only 7 % of the current US level at market exchange 
rates (see Chart 35), or about 13 % at purchasing power parity. In a historical comparison, the 
current Chinese capital stock pro capita stands at 25 % of the US level in the 1930s, and it is 
close to the level reached by Japan in the early 1970s. China’s capital-stock-to-GDP ratio is 
estimated at 2.4 in 2010, somewhat below the average in a larger country sample. Overall, 
these indicators suggest that China still has room to accumulate capital as it keeps developing.
Second, the available empirical evidence does not suggest that the effi ciency of China’s 
capital would decline rapidly. While the capital-stock-to-output ratio is increasing in China, which 
means that the new capital is accompanied by lower GDP growth than in the past, this process is 
gradual and refl ects the shift from labour-intensive agriculture to capital-intensive manufacturing. 
Bai et al. (2006) found that the return on capital was steadily above 15 % in the 1993-2005 
period. Looking through conjunctural fl uctuations, industrial profi t margins have been growing 
steadily at 6 % per year since the early nineties, indicating that, on average, there has been no 
increase in losses owing to unproductive investment.
These arguments, of course, do not mean that all of China’s investments are effi ciently 
allocated. As argued by Dollar and Wei (2007), investment by SOEs presents lower marginal 
returns to capital than investment by private or foreign fi rms (by 23 to 54 percentage points in the 
mid-2000s). If SOEs were investing fi nancial resources more effi ciently, the country could work 
with up to 8 % less capital without this negatively affecting its GDP growth.
Nonetheless, the low level of China’s capital stock and the steady marginal returns to 
capital suggest that the current pace of China’s capital formation could continue in the short-
to-medium run.
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3.2 HAS CHINA REACHED THE LEWIS TURNING POINT?
Shifting the focus to total factor productivity growth stemming from labour restructuring across 
sectors, the turning point also seems to be further off. This is due to three main reasons: (i) 
China’s still abundant rural labour supply, (ii) inward FDI to the mainland areas, and (iii) the 
authorities’ efforts to lower the costs of migration.
As experience has shown in Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, in their early stages 
of development economies with large agricultural sectors and underdeveloped manufacturing 
and services industries can achieve rapid growth via the reallocation of their labour force to 
higher productivity non-agricultural activities. At the beginning of the process, non-agricultural 
wages are kept low by the excess labour supply from the agricultural sector, despite signifi cant 
increases in labour productivity. However, as labour supply from the agricultural sector tightens, 
the marginal products of labour in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors converge and 
agricultural wages start to increase, putting an upward pressure on wages in the non-agricultural 
sector as well. This is what is known as “the Lewis turning point”.
Empirical evidence on whether China has reached the “Lewis turning point” is highly 
controversial. By investigating various statistics on rural labour force, Cai and Wang (2008) 
suggest that the turning point is now approaching in China. Zhang et al. (2010) use micro-level 
wage data in six provinces and conclude that the turning point in China was already reached in 
2003. Minami and Ma (2009) claim, conversely, that the turning point is still far off. They draw 
this conclusion by comparing marginal productivity with real wages in China’s agricultural sector. 
While there are recurrent concerns about, and some evidence of, rising manufacturing wages in 
China, there is still inconclusive evidence, at least for the time being, suggesting a clear break in 
the structural trend of labour costs.
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Historical evidence on other Asian economies would suggest that China still has a suffi cient 
pool of rural labour supply to support labour productivity growth in the coming years. As Chart 36 
confi rms, China’s agricultural labour share is relatively high compared to other emerging economies, 
i.e. slightly below 40 %. This level is not unprecedented: both Japan and Korea’s share was also 
around 40 % in the early stages of their development, but has now declined to below 10 %. Therefore, 
there is still, most probably, room for further labour restructuring and productivity gains.
In relation to the still oversized primary sector, China’s urbanization rate is only at 50 %. 
This is the same level as Japan in the mid-1960s and Korea in the mid-1970s (see Chart 37). If 
economic history is to be a guide, China’s urbanization process could continue at the current 
pace for more than a decade before slowing down. According to the UN’s 2011 revision of world 
urbanization prospects, China’s urbanization is expected to continue at the current pace until 
2025-30. Urbanization of that scale would create a sustained demand for infrastructural and 
housing investment, and ultimately contribute to rapid economic growth.
Another important aspect to be taken into account is China’s unfavourable demographic 
developments. The share of young workers available to migrate from rural areas is decreasing and, 
therefore, is expected to bring the Lewis turning point forward. Yet even from this perspective there 
are factors that may slow the process. First, capital, mainly in the form of foreign direct investment, 
is considered to be very mobile geographically and, thus, should be able to utilise cheap rural 
labour even in case of intensifi ed labour rigidity. The available evidence indeed confi rms that there 
has been a shift of capital from coastal to less developed mainland regions. FDI infl ows to the 
mainland area have increased by 52 % between 2008 and 2010, compared to a 10 % increase for 
the coastal areas. Second, government policies may also help mitigate the costs of migration. For 
instance, the recent efforts of the authorities to reform the “hukou” registration system and deliver 
a broader coverage of public services to workers with rural licences who migrate to the cities will 
likely increase the willingness of rural families to move.
3.3 HOW LONG CAN CHINA’S WORLD MARKET SHARE KEEP GROWING?
The need for economic rebalancing in China is often justifi ed by the argument that, after years of 
buoyant growth, China’s external demand is slowing. The ongoing economic and fi nancial crisis 
originating from the United States and then the euro area evidenced the limits of export-led growth 
models in East Asia, especially in the small open economies. In the case of China, however, two 
factors may mitigate the impact of the fall in external demand: (i) China’s sophisticated export 
product structure, with a price-inelastic demand curve; and (ii) the low domestic value-added 
content of exports. This is discussed below.
Advocates of the idea that China will be forced to rebalance due to a sharp deceleration in 
external demand use a dual argument, namely that after the crisis both the pace of world demand 
expansion and China’s gain in world market shares are set to slow. Their argument is that, even 
after the global economy has fully recovered from the fi nancial crisis, it is unlikely that China’s 
export growth will continue to persistently exceed 15-20 % per year, given the projected trend 
in domestic demand in the advanced economies. Even accounting for increasing demand from 
emerging economies and so-called South-South trade, it is estimated that this will imply future 
export growth at around 10-15 %, as Chart 38 shows. This is signifi cantly below the average of 
the period 2000-08. Also, gaining market shares is a process that has its own limits: historical 
evidence indicates that all export-led economies have reached a peak in their world market shares 
at a certain point of their development path (Guo and N’Diaye 2009b), as Chart 39 illustrates. The 
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reversal of market share gains is a natural step in the process of economic development. It refl ects 
increasing labour costs and the associated appreciation of the real effective exchange rate8.
There are, however, two important features of China’s exports that should mitigate the 
downward impact from weaker external demand on economic growth. First, an increasing share 
of China’s exports is highly sophisticated (see Box 6). This means that demand is price-inelastic, 
i.e. less sensitive to changes in prices. In 2007, high-tech sectors accounted for 33 % of China’s 
exports, based on the OECD’s technology intensity classifi cation. The high-tech ratio of China’s 
exports was well above that of Japan (20 %) or the EU (10 %). The “over-sophistication” of 
Chinese exports is related to the high share of IT and electrical machinery exports in total 
exports, which accounts for about one third of China’s total exports. While the quality of Chinese 
export products is still below that of most advanced competitors, recent empirical evidence 
shows that China has climbed up the quality ladder rapidly in the last few decades. By 2007, 
China had overtaken Korea, Hong Kong SAR and Singapore in terms of the average quality of 
exports (Pula and Santabarbara (2012)).
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8  The reversal of market shares of advanced economies in the Asian region was also related to the emergence of global 
supply chains, which contributed to a shift in market shares from Japan and the NIEs to China, the main export platform 
in this region..
Box 6
IS CHINA CLIMBING UP THE QUALITY LADDER?
The quality of Chinese exports is relevant from several perspectives, such as China’s 
competition vis-à-vis advanced economies in third markets, its long-term growth prospects 
or even its exchange rate policy. Despite the importance of the quality of Chinese export 
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products, data on it is scarce and ambiguous. This is mainly due to the fact that product 
quality is unobservable and diffi cult to measure. Empirical evidence suggests that China’s 
export structure is similar to that of advanced economies, while its unit values are much 
smaller. Based on the assumption that unit values refl ect the quality of exports, the 
mainstream literature concludes that China exports lower quality varieties of the same 
products that are exported by advanced economies. This fi nding usually also leads to the 
conclusion that Chinese exports present only limited competition challenges for advanced 
economies.
A recent study by Pula and Santabarbara (2012) on the quality of Chinese exports improves 
on the existing studies in two ways. The study relaxes the assumption that import prices 
refl ect quality, using not only prices, but also information on market shares to derive a 
quality measure. Moreover, it analyses the role played by global production networks in the 
quality of China’s exports by using micro data on Chinese exporting fi rms.
The analysis provides some interesting fi ndings. First, China’s share of the EU market is 
much larger than would be justifi ed by its low average prices, which implies that the quality 
of Chinese exports is high compared to many competitors (see Chart A). As early as 1995, 
the distribution mean of the estimated quality of Chinese export products was higher than 
that of other emerging economies, such as Latin America, the EU New Member States 
(NMS) and the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) countries.
Second, Chinese exports have gained quality relative to other competitors since 1995, 
indicating that the country is climbing up the quality ladder. Between 1995 and 2007, the 
quality of exports from emerging economies caught up with the level of more advanced 
economies. The quality upgrading was most marked in China, the NMS and the ASEAN 
countries. By 2007, China had over taken the NIEs in terms of export quality and had gained 
fourth position in the study’s country sample, ranking after Japan, the United States and 
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Second, the relatively high sophistication of China’s exports is due to imported 
technology via multinational companies and relates to the emergence of global supply chains 
in Asia (Pula and Santabarbara (2012)). The high import content of exports means that China’s 
the EU-15 advanced economies. China 
has increased the quality of its export 
products and, if this trend continues, it 
may pose a potential threat to the market 
position of the United States, Japan or 
the EU. According to these fi ndings, 
China not only exports the same kind 
of products as developed economies, 
but is also improving the quality of these 
products to catch up with its most 
technologically advanced competitors.
Third, the quality estimates also reveal 
a signifi cant sectoral heterogeneity. For 
instance, the quality of China’s exports 
of offi ce equipment is much higher than 
of the quality of its exports from the 
apparel industry. In fact, the quality of 
Chinese products seems to be higher 
in industries where multinational companies are involved and the domestic share in the 
total value added is relatively low (see Chart B). An empirical analysis on the supply side 
determinants of exports reveals that Chinese fi rms engaged in processing activity tend to 
export higher quality goods (see the Table).
All in all, these fi ndings suggest that China’s export quality and technological upgrading is 
related to the high-technology content of imported inputs and thus not embedded in the 
indigenous technological development of the country. Given that processing trade largely 
benefi ts multinational companies, these fi ndings also suggest that the rise in quality of 
China’s exports is a side-effect of the global trend of production delocalisation.
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Export quality and ??m characteristics
Dependent variable:
Standarized product quality (hs6 and city level data)
?? ?????????????? City and time  
????????????
Province and time 
????????????
Share processing trade 0.119*** 0.0984*** 0.114***
(0) (0) (0)
Share foreign ownership 0.00268 -0.0161 0.00867
(0.782) (0.116) (0.382)
Share private ownership 0.0150* -0.000833 0.0168*
(0.0743) (0.926) (0.0509)
Real GDP per capita -0.00423*** 0.00135 -0.00360***
(0) (0.386) (0)
Graduates/non-agricultural population -11.79*** -1.524 -4.195
(0) (0.718) (0.302)
Constant 0.0169 -0.0724 0.0130
(0.439) (0.126) (0.723)
Observations 119,035 119,035 119,035
R-squared 0.015 0.026 0.018
Notes: OLS estimates. Time and location ???? effects not reported. Sample: 1995, 2005, 2007. City level data. 
p-value in parentheses, ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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exports have a low domestic value-added content. Koopman et al. (2010) estimate that the 
domestic value-added content of China’s exports is close to 60 %, which compares with 85 % in 
Japan or 75 % in the United States. This, however, also means that China’s GDP is less affected 
by export volatility, and ultimately by fl uctuations in external demand. According to Pula and 
Peltonen (2011), external demand accounted for less than one-fourth of China’s total value-
added content in 2009, implying that a slowing of exports from 20 % to 10 % would only shave 
off 2-3 percentage points from GDP growth. Given China’s 10 % GDP growth before the crisis, 
this would have implied a substantial but not disruptive impact.
3.4 WILL PROTECTIONISM AGAINST CHINA RISE?
Finally, external factors may also eventually provide some incentives for Chinese policy-makers 
to adjust towards a more sustainable model of growth. One of these factors may be that the 
systematic undervaluation of the renminbi exchange rate, coupled with several hurdles to 
accessing China’s domestic markets from abroad and adverse developments in advanced 
economies, have been in turn fuelling protectionism against China in recent years. If this trend 
continues in the future, it may eventually encourage bolder reforms in the exchange rate and 
trade regimes of China. It is clear that trade protectionism has been on the rise despite WTO 
and G20 commitments. Take, for instance, the experience following the Lehman global shock of 
2008. Between November 2008 and October 2010, the Global Trade Alert database identifi ed 
690 protectionist measures announced or implemented by G20 members (51 % of the world 
total). Interestingly, 243 measures (35 %) were harmful to China. They included:
–  import tariffs, with a huge majority of cases issued by other emerging economies;
–  antidumping duties (the cases that made it to the headlines were issued by the EU 
and the US on steel pipes, footwear and tyres, but the majority of measures were 
again issued by other emerging economies);
–  hidden protectionism such as state aid, export subsidies and non-tariff barriers.
The correlation between the rise in the unemployment rate of advanced economies 
and trade complaints against China has also been striking, as the IMF (2011) has documented. 
However, fears of a widespread surge in trade protectionism appear to be unfounded thus far.
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4 THE THORNY PATH TO REBALANCING
4.1 STOCKTAKING OF REBALANCING POLICIES
The Chinese authorities are well aware of the unsustainable foundations of Chinese growth over 
the longer run. As early as 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao cautioned that “the biggest problem with 
China’s economy is that the growth is unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.” 
Accordingly, several areas which require rebalancing measures have been identifi ed, including: 
(i) widening the social safety net and raising household incomes and, ultimately, consumption; 
(ii) removing the distortions in relative prices – mainly in the exchange rate and input costs –to 
exploit real comparative advantages and make the model more sustainable; (iii) reducing the 
government’s interference in the allocation of resources; and (iv) liberalising the fi nancial system, 
which would allow for a more effi cient and effective intermediation of savings.
The 12th Five Year Plan, approved in March 2011, seems to have provided the required 
reforms with the right sense of direction, although concreteness may be still lacking in several 
areas. In particular, the authorities may have to put more effort into the enhancement of the 
services sector and consumption relative to the promotion of manufacturing and investment. 
Also, fi nancial market reform lacks traction, thus raising doubts as to what the authorities are 
really aiming at.
Table 3 gives a broad idea of what is being done, but also of what has been reversed and 
what remains to be done in several rebalancing areas. The main indications can be summarised 
as follows.
Table 3 Measures to rebalance China’s economy: an overview
In process Reversed To be done
Strengthen private domestic demand
Boost private consumption  
Household and rural incomes
Implementation of labour law and increasing minimum wages X
Labour mobility (“hokou”) X
Social housing subsidies X
Agricultural subsidies X
Income tax reform X
Consumption subsidies (cars and durable goods) X X
Reduce precautionary savings via enhanced welfare
Rural and urban pensions reform X
Education X
Health care (subsidies and infrastructure) X
Reduction of inequality X
Boost private investment  
Crowding out from public investment stimuli 2008-2010 X
Financial sector reform (see below)  X
Export-led model discontinuation / Private sector promotion
Exchange rate reform X 07/08-06/10
Export tax rebate system X
Input costs X
Manufacturing sector’s domestic value added
Technological upgrading X
Service sector development X
Inland regions development X  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1301
–  Some initiatives have been taken to boost consumption, raise household and 
rural incomes, and reduce precautionary savings and inequality. For instance, the 
expansion of the social safety net (pension, healthcare and the education system) has 
accelerated since the eruption of the global fi nancial crisis in 2008. However, some 
of the main root problems have not been addressed yet: income tax reform, which 
would allow a widening of the tax base, has not been initiated yet; a lot of progress 
has still to be made as regards the access to basic public services of those workers 
who have emigrated; and some of the incentives to foster consumption were only 
transitory in nature, as in the case of subsidies on car or durable goods acquisitions.
–  The authorities have not been particularly pro-active yet in reducing distortions in 
relative prices and inputs costs. This would be a crucial step in changing the incentive 
structure so as to promote economic rebalancing. In particular:
 –  On the exchange rate front, on 19 June 2010 the PBC announced the enhancement 
of the exchange rate fl exibility of the renminbi and confi rmed its peg to a basket of 
currencies instead of the US dollar only. However, as we have discussed in Section 
2.1.3, there is still considerable scope for reform in this fi eld.
 –  On the labour cost side, it has been acknowledged that an increase of nominal 
wages above nominal GDP would be required for rebalancing – a phenomenon 
that has not been observed yet, however, although the increase of minimum 
wages is a step in that direction.
 –  Regarding capital costs, real interest rates remain excessively low compared with 
output growth, which continues to set incentives to over-invest and distort the 
allocation of capital. Despite recent measures, further interest rate liberalization 
and the move of monetary policy towards a price-signal-based transmission 
mechanism are necessary. These steps would help to raise the cost of capital 
and allocate savings more effi ciently.
 –  The under-pricing of energy and low-level environmental protection have also 
de facto subsidised the current manufacturing-oriented model, a situation which 
should be reversed.
–  Private initiative in the allocation of resources should be further encouraged. 
Measures taken to boost the weight of the private sector and the services sector 
Table 3 Measures to rebalance China’s economy: an overview (cont’d)
In process Reversed To be done
?????????? ????????????????????????????????????
Interest rate liberalization and price-based monetary policy X 2004-2012 X
Bond market development X
Market driven banking sector X
Stock market development X
????????????????????????????????????????????????  X
Other structural reforms
?????????????????????????? X
Strategic industries development X  
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in the economy, thus making the model less state – and export – led, have not 
evidenced much progress thus far. In particular, while the 12th Five Year Plan 
ambitiously targets a four-percentage-point-of-GDP increase in the share of 
services, this does not seem fully credible given the underperformance of the 
previous plan in this fi eld (see Table 4).
–  The fi scal budget does not yet show any major shift in the expenditure pattern to 
support rebalancing policies (see Table 5).
–  Measures to reform fi nancial markets and gradually open the capital account are 
also mentioned, but not well detailed in the 12th Five Year Plan (see Table 4). 
China should develop a comprehensive agenda in this fi eld. Continued delay could 
lead to a disorderly development, with the fi nancial system outpacing supervisory 
capabilities and suffering from regulatory gaps. The reform strategy should be 
fl exible enough, paying particular attention to the proper sequencing between 
exchange rate reform, changes in monetary policy management and liberalisation 
of interest rates, development of 
fi nancial markets and opening up 
of cross-border fi nancial fl ows.
All in all, the ultimate indicator that 
the policy-driven rebalancing process has 
progressed too slowly is that there has been 
no tangible sign of decline in domestic savings, 
which is an essential component of the agenda. 
As discussed in Section 2.1.1, the narrowing 
current account surplus has been explained by 
the impact of policy stimuli on investment, and 
not by a decrease in domestic savings.
4.2  IS REBALANCING EMBEDDED IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT? WHAT IS THE 
ROLE OF POLICY?
The analysis conducted in Section 3 led to the conclusion that not only has China’s growth model 
delivered in the past, it is expected to deliver relatively sustained growth in the foreseeable future. 
While this model engenders imbalances, such imbalances do not fundamentally impair its main 
Table 4 Rebalancing policies. A comparison between the 11th and 12th Five Year Plan
11th FYP target 2006-10 actual 12 FYP target
1. Real GDP growth 7.5% p.a 11.2% p.a 7% p.a
2. Income policies
Per capita disposable income of urban households 5% p.a. 9.7% p.a. >7% p.a.
Per capita net income of rural households 5% p.a. 8.9% p.a. >7% p.a.
3. Social security
Population covered by basic urban pension 5.1% p.a. 8.1% p.a. 7.5% p.a.
Coverage of basic health insurance 
(percentage of population)
- - 3%
4. Social housing 
Construction of economic housing - - 36 million units
5. Services sector development 
Share of services in GDP (percentages) 3 pps 2.7 pps 4 pps
Share of services in total employment (percentages) 4 pps 3.5 pps -
Table 5 Composition of the 2011 budget  
of the central government
(selected items, expenditures in percentage of total)
2010 2011 budget
Education 5.3 5.5
Social security and employment 7.8 8.1
Medical and health care 3.1 3.2
Guaranteeing adequate housing 2.3 2.4
Urban and rural community 
programs 0.3 0.3
Agriculture, forestry and water 
conservancy 8.0 8.4
Stockpiling grain, edible oils and 
other commodities 1.6 2.1
Transport, transportation costs 5.4 5.3
Commercial services industry 1.7 3.3
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achievements for the time being. Factors such as 
the misallocation of capital, fi nancial repression 
and the low return on FX reserves shave off a few 
percentage points from GDP growth and create 
losses on external assets; and yet at around 8 % 
China’s growth may be still strong enough to 
ensure social prosperity to a suffi cient extent. In 
other words, the need for urgent implementation 
of rebalancing policies is far from being apparent.
In addition, historical experience suggests 
that in an economy transiting from high to lower 
but stable growth, economic rebalancing can to 
a signifi cant extent also take place “naturally”, i.e. 
independently of rebalancing policies. The (partial) 
economic rebalancing of Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan, to mention the most relevant examples, 
occurred to a signifi cant extent as a “natural” 
consequence of catching up.
In the same vein, it could be expected that, as China develops further, the decline in 
the marginal productivity of capital will naturally limit investment. Also, the depletion of cheap 
rural labour will increase wages and the level of consumption. Demographic changes will also 
naturally contribute. The dependency ratio, whose decline we discussed in Section 1.1, is now 
expected to start rising again by 2015 at the latest (see Chart 40). As a result, the number of 
people who are only in a position to consume – the oldest and the youngest members of the 
population – will increase by defi nition, a development which will naturally lower the savings rate 
and the ensuing domestic funding of investment.
If rebalancing will also be, to some extent, a “natural” process embedded in economic 
development, what is the role of rebalancing policies?
In our view, the key lesson to be drawn from economic history is that not all catching-
up experiences prove successful. Many economies are caught in the so-called “middle income 
trap”, i.e. they are unable to revitalise growth once the extensive sources of growth we discussed 
in Section 3 are depleted.
In order to avoid the middle-income trap and secure sustainable economic growth, a 
bolder and more comprehensive set of domestic reforms is required in China. This is because 
in a lower-growth environment:
–  The corporate sector will have to operate with reduced profi t margins owing to the 
increased cost of capital and labour. Therefore, protected segments in the product 
market should be liberalised and deregulated, and price distortions eliminated;
–  Financial institutions will have to ensure a much more effi cient allocation of capital 
than is the case under the current fi nancial repression model, in an environment 
where price and information distortions may bring about signifi cant losses and 
fi nancial stability risks. Therefore, fi nancial markets should be liberalised further;
Chart 40 China’s dependency ratio
(people of non-working age as a share of those of working age; 
percentages)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
ELDERLY
CHILD
TOTAL
Sources: Haver, United Nations.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 52 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1301
–  The demand from large parts of the household sector for higher relative incomes 
and increased consumer spending will rise. Therefore, wider social security buffers 
and more intensive income redistribution should be pursued; this would also help 
avoid social unrest.
All in all, as the transition to very high real per capita income requires effi cient resource 
allocation to enhance the development of sophisticated services, structural policies – for 
instance, measures that enhance competition in domestic sectors, eliminate fi nancial repression 
and promote advanced education – would facilitate this transition.
Conversely, “natural” market forces coupled with unsound policies may well result 
in sub-optimal economic outcomes, both domestically and globally. We have learned that 
unsustainable global imbalances across the key major world players have been a major root 
cause of the still unsolved global fi nancial and economic crisis – as argued in the literature 
reviewed in Dorrucci and McKay (2011). Macroeconomic and structural policies should therefore 
promote the orderly unwinding of such imbalances before it takes place via abrupt and painful 
market adjustment. Multilateral cooperation can make its own contribution to setting the right 
incentives for major economies to rebalance.
To sum up, a policy-led, rather than solely market-driven, rebalancing of the Chinese 
economy is crucial for the smooth economic transition of the country towards more sustainable 
growth, both from a domestic and global perspective. Policy-makers should act pre-emptively, 
because it is very diffi cult, if not impossible, to recognise the deceleration of an economy’s 
underlying growth in real time. It usually takes many years for structural policies to have a 
tangible impact on the economy and they should, therefore, be implemented well before risks 
to growth materialise.
4.3 THE POLITICS OF REBALANCING
China’s leadership is well aware of the limitations of the producer-biased and export-led 
model. Interestingly, there is no major disagreement between the Chinese and the international 
community about the need for rebalancing policies to ensure China’s smooth transition to a 
more sustainable model. The disagreement is more about how fast the reform measures should 
be implemented.
It has been argued that intertwined economic and political interests make China’s 
rebalancing more diffi cult and cause the reform process to advance slowly (see e.g. Pilling 2012). 
Political resistance to the reforms stems from various sources. First, in a system where political 
success at the local level has been historically dependent on quantitative growth, reforms that 
emphasise the quality of growth are bound to meet some resistance. Second, the current growth 
model required to keep some strategic sectors of the economy closed and under state control 
(e.g. fi nancial markets, services, heavy industry). The planned opening up of these sectors to 
competition does not only meet resistance from SOEs and banks, but is also questioned in 
government circles owing to worries about exhausting the “privilege” of direct macroeconomic 
policy management. Not surprisingly, major resistance is observed in the export lobby, which is 
one of the most infl uential in China and the one which reforms affect most directly (Wen 2012).
Certain institutions may also be held accountable for the authorities’ sluggish progress 
with their reform agenda. As an example, exchange rate policy is set by the Politburo Standing 
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Committee, China’s top de facto power organ, on the basis of information collected from the 
PBC, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Development and 
Reform Commission.
Given that the process includes a large number of institutions with varying interests, 
changes to the exchange rate policy are diffi cult to accomplish. Were exchange rate policy 
delegated to the monetary authorities exclusively, changes could probably be faster.
It is understandable that there is policy resistance to change a model of growth 
that delivered for more than thirty years. This slow pace may also well involve short-term 
advantages. Insuffi cient progress, however, would imply longer-term costs, given the fading 
away of the longer-run supporting factors. Riedel (2011) argued, among others, that political 
vested interests which manage to block economic policy reforms necessary for the fi nal catch-
up phase inevitably contribute to countries falling into the middle-income trap. To avoid this, 
authorities should accelerate the implementation of their reform agenda, despite the resistance 
from interest groups.
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